The innovative way the Springboks are using Manie Libbok in defence.
A look into the tactical and statistical differences of the Boks with Libbok at 10.
In this analysis, we delve into the defensive strategies employed by the Springboks both before and after Manie Libbok's emergence. In the first part of this new series, our aim is to compare and evaluate how Libbok's introduction has given rise to a new role within the Springbok defensive system.
While Handrè Pollard has been a stalwart figure for the Springboks over the years, the inclusion of Manie Libbok in the 2023 test campaign has injected fresh dynamics into both their offensive and defensive tactics. Building upon our previous examination of the statistical disparities between Pollard and Libbok, we now shift our focus to a more comprehensive exploration of the evolution of South Africa's game plan, using game footage as our primary perspective.
Defending in a rush
Employing a rush defence is a high-risk, high-reward strategy that demands players to maintain close proximity while moving at high speeds to close down opposition players. However, in recent years, we've witnessed players like Faf de Klerk and Pieter-Steph du Toit assume "disruptor" roles, surging off the defensive line faster than their teammates to introduce added chaos and pressure to the opponents' attack.
It's worth noting that this particular role is typically deployed during general play. As these players are often involved in set-pieces where they don't have the freedom to execute the same disruptive tactics.
Set-piece defence in the Pre-Libbok Era
During this period, the Springboks employed a more traditional rush defence strategy during set-pieces. Players maintained a tight defensive line without any individual player significantly advancing beyond the others. As a result, the line often appeared to slope backward, resembling the illustration below.
In a full lineout, where every forward is engaged, the flyhalf typically assumed the role of defending the inside channel, which is positioned closest to the lineout. This inside channel frequently became the target for crash ball runs due to its proximity to support players. Additionally, there could be a gap between the flyhalf and the forwards, making the flyhalf a less formidable obstacle compared to an inside centre like Damian de Allende.
In the case of a shortened lineout, the Springboks preferred to position du Toit and Kolisi as the inside defenders, bolstering security for the inside channel while the backline maintained an organised and compact formation.
This defensive structure remained consistent, with du Toit, Kolisi, and Pollard forming a unified rush alongside the rest of the backline as a single unit. However, this approach appears to undergo a change in the absence of Pollard.
Set-piece defence in the Libbok Era
Manie Libbok has assumed the role of Springbok flyhalf for the majority of the 2023 test campaign, bringing with him a unique skill set and physical attributes distinct from Handrè Pollard. One standout facet of Libbok's game is his exceptional speed for a fly-half, characterised by remarkable agility and the ability to accelerate rapidly from a standstill.
Consequently, the Springbok coaching staff has identified Libbok as a key player for implementing a more aggressive defensive approach during set-pieces, with a focus on disrupting opposition attacks.
In such scenarios, it is often the case that Libbok's primary objective is not to make a tackle but to disrupt the opposing team's attack. In the instances mentioned above, Libbok rushes forward with the assurance that if the attack targets the inside channel, they will encounter the formidable presence of two robust flankers.
However, there are occasions when Libbok finds himself without immediate support on the inside. An example of this unfolded during a match against Scotland, where they initiated an attack from a full lineout, leaving Libbok without the cover of du Toit and Kolisi in close proximity.
Scotland capitalised on this situation, and Sione Tuipulotu surged directly over Libbok, who was unable to make the tackle. Fortunately, Malcolm Marx quickly arrived to provide cover and execute the tackle, having rushed across from the back of the lineout.
A similar scenario occurred in the match against New Zealand at Twickenham, this time following a scrum. Libbok once again rushed off the defensive line but was ultimately beaten by Jordie Barrett.
In a recent interview on the Off The Ball Youtube channel, John Dobson was questioned about Libbok. Following a discussion about Libbok's noteworthy ability to "forget mistakes like he was a goldfish," Dobson went on to highlight a particular aspect of Libbok's play. He mentioned, “A thing you would have seen in a couple of the earlier games is people going down his channel, and that I think is a challenge (for Libbok), because he makes the tackles because he is very brave but he is just 77 kilograms and that is a challenge in a test match of this level”. You can find an excerpt of this interview here.
This leads me to conclude that the rationale behind Libbok's rush role is rooted in the Springbok coaching staff's recognition of this challenge. They seem to be actively working to create a scenario in which Libbok can be a more disruptive presence on the field rather than relying solely on him as a conventional line tackler.
Examining the Data
Using Oval Insights data, a few things stand out when looking at Libbok’s tackling stats. At Test level, in 2023, he made 24 out of 34 tackles (70.6%). However, his tackle success rate from “covering” or “chase” tackles is 100%, while his success rate from “line” tackles is only 64%. This could again be attributed to his small stature, as line tackles often require a player to use brute force to bring down an opponent running directly at them. Alternatively, chase and covering tackles offer better opportunities for tacklers to wrap opponents legs. Most interestingly, 38.2% of his tackles were deemed “ineffective tackle contact”.
Comparing this to his 2022/23 URC data, he made 104 out of 158 tackles (65.8%) which is a lower tackle success rate than his test career, yet he had less “ineffective tackle contacts” with them making up 29.7% of his total.
I believe the key to this new tactic of using Libbok as a disruption defender, is that he has the required support to make a tackle should he miss. This is made easier when opponents play shorter lineouts, allowing Kolisi and du Toit to defend the inside channel and Libbok the opportunity to rush into the space where a flyhalf would generally like to be making passes.
Pollard's baseline defensive statistics are similar to those of Libbok, as he made 52 out of 74 tackles (70.3%) in 2021 and 2022 combined. However, a notable difference is that only 21.6% of Pollard's 74 tackles were deemed 'ineffective tackle contact.' This difference could be attributed to his larger physical frame, which provides more mass behind his tackles.
This innovative way of using Libbok has created another way of disrupting the flow of opposition attacks. And is another example of Head Coach Jacques Nienaber’s brilliance as a defensive coach.
Time will tell if opponents begin targeting the inside channel when Libbok has less support, but it will most certainly be something Nienaber has made his players aware of.
In the next part of this series, I will be taking a look into the Springbok attack, how it has developed, and been influenced by Libbok’s introduction.
Absolutely brilliant Angus. Making me look smart at the braais every weekend!
Awesome Insight . Thank you !